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NORTH ATLANTIC IN CHINAU.S. RELATIONS
Abstract. Since 2019, the U.S. Administration has included the Arc
tic into its overall China containment policy. Iceland and Greenland at
tract its special attention as traditional U.S. allies, which play key roles
for the control over NATO’s vital maritime communications in North
Atlantic, but which have lately developed vibrant contacts with PRC.
Greenland has been on the radar in Washington since World War II,
regarded within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine, which, although
voided officially, still influences the American foreign policy thinking.
Now this approach is reinforced by the growing U.S. activities in the Arc
tic at large and by the global confrontation with Beijing. The key current
interests of the United States in Greenland include the security of the
strategically important Thule Air Base, preventing large Chinese invest
ments, which would involve the island into the Polar Silk Road initiative,
and a potential extraction of rare earth elements.
Since mid2019, the U.S. have launched several major initiatives re
lated to Greenland, the most famous one is President Trump’s offer to
purchase it from Denmark. While China focuses on largescale mining
projects which Greenland needs to obtain economic independence, and
peopletopeople contacts, the U.S. concentrate on public policy mea
sures indicating a clear desire to put Greenland under a tighter American
control bypassing Copenhagen. Denmark, although a close NATO ally
of the United States, is concerned by the activities of both great powers
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and tries to become a good patron for Greenland to prevent its secession.
Meanwhile, the Greenlandic authorities confirm their intentions to
struggle for a fullfledged statehood, reflecting the moods of 2/3 of the
population.
The article suggests three mediumterm scenarios, with Greenland
remaining in a gradually looser union with Denmark, moving into the
U.S. domain or acquiring independence and thus becoming subject to a
hard international competition. The next few years may be of special im
portance for further development, which will also affect Russia as the big
gest Arctic nation.
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А.К. Криворотов
Северная Атлантика в китайско*американских отношениях
Аннотация. Администрация США с 2019 г. включила Арктику в
общий контекст своей политики сдерживания Китая. Особая значи
мость при этом придается Исландии и Гренландии как традицион
ным американским союзникам, которые обеспечивают контроль
над жизненно важными для НАТО морскими коммуникациями в
Северной Атлантике, но в последнее время активно развивают свя
зи с КНР.
Гренландия со времен Второй мировой войны привлекала вни
мание Вашингтона, который рассматривал ее через призму «док
трины Монро» (официально отмененной, но попрежнему влияю
щей на американское политическое мышление). Теперь же к этому
прибавились общая активизация США в Арктике и глобальное про
тивостояние с Пекином. Важнейшие современные интересы США
на острове связаны с безопасностью их стратегически важной авиа
базы в Туле, с предотвращением проникновения крупных китай
ских инвестиций и подключения Гренландии к инициативе «По
лярный Шёлковый путь», а также с перспективами добычи редкозе
мельных материалов.
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С середины 2019 г. США предприняли ряд крупных инициатив
в отношении Гренландии, самая известная — предложение прези
дента Д. Трампа купить остров у Дании. Если КНР делает упор на
масштабные горнорудные проекты, необходимые Гренландии для
обретения экономической независимости, и человеческие контак
ты, то США сосредоточились на мерах публичной политики, в кото
рых явственно просматривается желание поставить Гренландию
под свой более плотный контроль, минуя Копенгаген. Дания, хотя и
является союзником США по НАТО, обеспокоена активностью
обеих великих держав и пытается стать для острова привлекатель
ным патроном во избежание его отделения. Власти же самой Грен
ландии, опираясь на мнение 2/3 населения, намерены бороться за
полноценную государственность.
Предложены три сценария среднесрочного развития событий,
при которых Гренландия остается в слабеющей унии с Данией, по
падает в зависимость от США или обретает независимость, стано
вясь предметом ожесточенной международной конкуренции. Тра
ектория будет во многом определяться в ближайшие годы, оказывая
влияние и на интересы России как крупнейшего арктического госу
дарства.
Ключевые слова: противостояние КНР—США, Гренландия,
арктическая политика, редкоземельные материалы, сценарии.
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For nearly three decades after the Cold War, the Arctic was witnessing
a remarkably low level of international tension, with a dramatically redu
ced military presence and an unparalleled cooperation on regional gover
nance, environment, and indigenous peoples. It remained virtually una
ffected even by the RussiaWest standoff since 2014, giving rise to a popu
lar concept of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ [Kapyla and Mikkola].
However, around 2018 U.S. Navy officials started projecting the glo
bal tension to the North, and this became an official American policy du
ring the Arctic Council Ministerial meeting in Rovaniemi in May 2019.
Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, delivered a speech the day be
fore the meeting, accusing Russia of aggressive behavior in the Arctic and
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voicing doubts about the Chinese intents. ‘The Pentagon warned just last
week that China could use its civilian research presence in the Arctic to
strengthen its military presence, including by deploying submarines to the
region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks,’ Secretary said [Johnson and
Wroughton]. The Ministerial itself became the first one not to adopt a joint
statement, due to the U.S. disagreement with its climate goals. Soon after,
in June 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense adopted its new Arctic
Strategy with an outspoken focus on ‘limiting the ability of China and
Russia to leverage the region as a corridor for competition’ [U.S. Depart
ment of Defense, 2019].
The passages on Russia look like reverting to a traditional Cold War
rhetoric, reflecting the recent (rather limited, but highly publicized) partial
restoration of the old Soviet military presence in the Arctic. Meanwhile,
the focus on China is a brand new element, indicating that the Arctic is
now involved in the global U.S. strategy of containing China.
Iceland and Greenland, which both have close ties with China, attract
special U.S. attention in the form of dramatically intensified official con
tacts and statements. In geostrategic terms, both islands belong to Green
landIcelandUnited Kingdom gap (GIUK), crucial for the logistic ‘tran
satlantic link’ between the U.S. and its European allies. GIUK lost much
of its importance for NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but se
ems to have regained it now with the view to Russian and potentially Chi
nese naval presence [The GIUK Gap’s strategic significance].
This article focuses primarily on the development of Greenland as a
new arena of ChinaU.S. competition.
GreenlandChina relations and U.S. concerns
Greenland is the world’s biggest island with some 2.1 million sq. km of
land area (mostly icecovered) and merely 57,000 inhabitants. Together
with the continental Denmark and the Faroe islands, it forms the Danish
Kingdom, although in geographical terms, Greenland belongs to North
America. Its capital, Nuuk, is some 4,000 km away from Copenhagen.
Denmark has an interest in the island as its only Arctic territory and
an important asset in the bilateral relations with the U.S., but tends to give
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Greenland a growing autonomy [Kuo]. Under the SelfGovernment Act,
which entered into force in 2009, Greenlandic authority covers nearly all
issues but for foreign, security policy and currency emission. According to
opinion polls, two thirds of the population favor secession from Denmark,
but the Greenlandic economy is not selfsufficient, relying heavily on sea
food (95 % of exports) and the annual transfer from Copenhagen, the so
called block grant. Developing its abundant natural resources, like metal
ore and potentially hydrocarbons, is the island’s main hope for a rapid
economic development and prosperity, and Chinese companies (often
operating via, or in cooperation with, third countries) have been most ac
tive.
By late 2012, Chinese investors nearly made a massive entry into Gre
enland. Its government headed by Kuupik Kleist maintained a highlevel
dialog with Beijing and welcomed Chinese companies to several major
projects. The most advanced was Isua iron ore mine 150 km north of
Nuuk, to be constructed and operated by London Mining, a UK company
with strong ties to Sichuan Xinye Mining Investment Co. But the subsequ
ent government shifts in Greenland, bankruptcy of London Mining and
the fall in raw material prices made the projects stall. The ruby mine of
LNS Group from Norway is the only plant launched since then.
The mutual interest remained, however. Kim Kielsen, the present
Greenlandic Prime Minister, paid a visit to China in 2017 to discuss op
portunities for Chinese investments and hiring Chinese companies for the
badly needed modernization and construction of three airports, in Nuuk,
Ilulissat and Qaqortoq. It was presumably this latter issue that triggered the
increased U.S. activity.
America has three key concerns about ChinaGreenland relations.
Military security is most widely articulated. In Thule in the north of
the island, the U.S. operates an air force base, an antiballistic early war
ning radar and the only American deep water port in the Arctic. This pre
sence is based on a special accord with Denmark of 1951, to which Green
land is also a signatory since 2004.
Military considerations obviously played a role in 2016 when Washin
gton pressed on Copenhagen to halt the purchase of Gronnedal (Kangil
linguit), a decommissioned U.S.built naval base, by the Syanganbased
General Nice Group, which now owns the Isua mine. Similarly, when the
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Greenlandic Government shortlisted China Communications Constructi
on Company for the three airports contract in 2018, the Danish authorities
got a strong public message from Katie Wheelbarger, U.S. Deputy Assis
tant Secretary of Defense. She warned that China used its economic power
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Map of Greenland with actual or potential Chinese and U.S. projects. Legend: 1 airfield/
airports, 2 deposits of rare earth elements, 3 Chinese nonREE mining projects.
to establish a military presence in poor countries (what the present U.S.
Administration calls a ‘debttrap diplomacy’) [Lucht].
The broader foreign policy agenda is also involved. The United States
denies the concept of China as a ‘nearArctic state’, formalized in 2018 in
China’s Arctic Policy. From this point, involving Greenland in the Polar
Silk Road initiative is seen as a threat of China getting political influence
in the Arctic.
Rare earth elements (REE), indispensable for modern electric and
electronic devices, represent a third critical issue. China controls up to
98 % of the global supply of some REEs [The Geopolitics of Rare Earth
Elements]. The United States, therein its defense industry, imports over
70 % of the REEs from China and is well aware of this vulnerability. It
won a case in the WTO in 2014 and made China lift the REE export quo
tas. However, in late May 2019, days after President Xi Jinping visited JL
MAG RareEarth Co in Ganzhou, a spokesperson from the National De
velopment and Reform Commission indicated that PRC could ‘weaponi
ze’ the rare earths in case of an escalation of the trade war with the U.S.
[China indicates it may use rare earths as weapon...].
Greenland could potentially help breach this Chinese nearmonopoly.
REE have been discovered many places over the island rim. The most pro
mising area, the Gardar Province in the south, may alone contain about a
quarter of the world resources [Northam].
The U.S. vs Chinese approaches
The U.S. Administration has launched several broadly publicized ini
tiatives on Greenland since mid2019. These included signing two MOUs
with Greenlandic ministries, a request to reestablish a Consulate in Nuuk
and, above all, President Donald Trump’s sensational offer in August 2019
to buy the island from Denmark in what he presented as ‘a real estate de
al’. Mette Fredriksen, the Danish Prime Minister, rejected the proposal as
‘absurd’ and stressed: ‘Greenland is not Danish. Greenland is Greenlan
dic’. Trump in turn called her ‘nasty’ and cancelled his planned visit to
Copenhagen, but later on both parties tried to downplay the incident.
In April 2020, the U.S. Administration also announced a 12.1 million
USD economic aid package for projects in Greenland within mining sec
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tor, tourism and education. The local Government, Naalakkersuisut, wel
comed the offer as a sign of an increased bilateral cooperation, while it ca
used an outrage among many politicians in Copenhagen.
These, rather extravagant, steps represent nothing new really — Presi
dent H.Truman offered to purchase Greenland as far back as in 1946. The
U.S. decisionmakers have since World War II viewed the island within
the framework of the Monroe Doctrine, which, although voided formally
2013, still influences the American thinking [Berry]. But now this traditio
nal approach is reinforced by the growing U.S. interest for the Arctic and
its global clash with China.
Judging by its recent moves, the U.S. Administration seems to doubt
Denmark’s capability of steering Greenland and would rather establish a
more direct American control, even in a confrontational mode. This is
very asymmetric to China’s soft approach. In the past couple of years, the
Chinese have not been active in political contacts with Greenland, while
sending dozens of employees to its fish processing units, arranging cultural
exchanges and preparing large extractive projects. These include Kvanef
jeld REE mine, the above mentioned Isua and Citronen fjord zink and
lead mine in the north.
Kvanefjeld is among the biggest deposits in Gardar Province with re
sources worth net 1.4bn USD. Australiabased Greenland Minerals Ltd.
holds the license, working in close partnership with its largest shareholder,
Shenghe Resources Holding Co., Ltd. from Chengdu in Sichuan Provin
ce. The Kvanefjeld mine is poised to become its third major rare earth
mine outside China [Hu Zesong].
While Americans have concerns about Chinese investments in Green
land, they do not seem ready to overbid China. For example, their activiti
es in the Gardar Province are so far limited to a joint aerial survey in sum
mer 2019 [Airborne hyperspectral survey...]. Instead, the U.S. prefer pub
lic policy moves and pressing on Denmark as its NATO ally.
This was not unexpected. We predicted in this journal in 2013 that at
some point the U.S. would finally try to halt the growth of the Chinese
presence in Arctic Scandinavia, relying on noneconomic arguments. The
focus on security policy and Atlantic solidarity would eventually pose the
Nordic countries with complicated dilemmas [Krivorotov].
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Denmark and Greenland at crossroads
Until recently, the Danes had been positive to Chinese activities in the
Arctic, including investments in Greenland [Fuglede et al.]. Denmark was
a strong supporter of China getting a permanent observer status in the Arc
tic Council in 2013.
However, as the region is getting involved in the great power rivalry,
Denmark looks increasingly concerned about the fate of Greenland and
the role of China [Mingming Shi and Lanteigne]. In November 2019, for
the first time ever, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) star
ted its annual open Risk Assessment with the Arctic, focusing on Russia
and China. DDIS noted among other that in Denmark and Greenland
‘China is using increased cooperation on research and trade as entry points
for influence’, stressing the close relations between the Chinese companies
and the government [Danish Defence Intelligence Service, 2019; see also
[Yang Jiang].
Over the past few years the Danish Government has sought to strike a
delicate balance between maintaining the vitally important good relations
with the U.S., retaining control over Greenland, and promoting invest
ments there while limiting Chinese involvement.
The three airports project is a characteristic case. Besides warning Co
penhagen against the Chinese, the U.S. Department of Defense indicated
that it might itself invest in dual use infrastructure in Greenland. Denmark
opted finally to avoid any foreign involvement by providing 450 million
DKK (70 million USD) of public money [Ofjord Blaxek?r, Lanteigne &
Mingming Shi]. Danish politicians and observers think, however, that in
the longer run an increased U.S. military presence in Greenland is inevi
table.
Mette Fredriksen, the present Danish Prime Minister, cares visibly
more about Greenland than her predecessors, both in terms of paying vi
sits, rendering practical assistance and giving the island a formal say in Ar
ctic foreign policy. When Danish Foreign Minister Jeppe Kofod paid his
first visit to Washington, DC in November 2019, he was accompanied by
his Greenlandic colleague, Ane Lone Bagger, contrary to the previous
practice [McGwin].
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At the same time, as Danish journalist Martin Breum notes, a way of
thinking has recently evolved in Copenhagen that the U.S. offer to buy
Greenland will likely curtail Greenlandic secessionism. The island leaders
should now realize that a ‘Greenland without ties to Denmark would rat
her... find that the U.S. will never accept other than total military control
over all of Greenland’s territory’ and the island would end up living like
‘the U.S. Virgin Islands, which Denmark sold to the U.S. in 1916 and
whose inhabitants, many of whom live below the poverty line, still have no
voting rights in the U.S.’ [Breum].
Some Greenlanders, like the former Premier Aqqaluk Lynge, fear also
that largescale (Chinese) mining may destroy the traditional Inuit culture
[Dyer], but the current government does not share these fears. Its immedi
ate reaction to D.Trump’s offer was ‘We're open for business, not for sale’.
Later on, Greenlandic executives at the Arctic Circle Assembly (Reykja
vik, October 2019) and Kim Kielsen in an interview with M.Breum made
it clear that they still pursue a complete independence. They foresee close
ties with Denmark and a continued defense cooperation with the U.S. and
NATO, while welcoming investments from all nations. In March 2020,
Naalakkersuisut suggested to open a Greenlandic representation (qua
siembassy) in China, to complement those already established in Brus
sels, Washington and Reykjavik [SchultzNielsen].
Future prospects and Russian reactions
The current situation shows clearly that any Chinese Arctic activity,
regardless of its nature, raises concerns and doubts in the U.S. and Den
mark in both political, economic and security context. China is likely to
face more troubles in Greenland and in the Norden at large in the years to
come.
To the contrary, Russia is a major concern, but entirely in military
terms. This is largely because Russian efforts concentrate in its own Arctic
sector, where the U.S. acknowledge its legitimate interests [U.S. Depart
ment of State, 2020].
This may be the reason why the Russian media show limited interest
to the situation on and around Greenland. Donald Trump’s bid for purc
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hase was the only exception, viewed by most Russian analysts as just anot
her move in the American Arctic and foreign policy, or global U.S.China
confrontation [Plevako].
The conservative Tsargrad TV predicted that the U.S. would continue
pressing on Denmark and influence the Greenlandic public opinion to ac
quire the island one way or another [Kak 102 goda nazad...]. The proposed
U.S. package for Greenland may somehow support this view indirectly, as
the money will be channeled to various U.S. agencies and consultants,
thus providing them with handson knowledge of Greenland and with soft
power opportunities.1
In our opinion, the development deserves a much closer attention in
Russia, as this involves not merely a huge Arctic territory (which has
among other put continental shelf claims overlapping with Russia’s), but
also the two global powers. In the midterm, one could foresee three sce
narios:
1. Greenland remains politically united with Denmark, but enjoys a
growing autonomy. U.S. military presence is enhanced under tripartite ag
reements. Denmark, vary of both American and Chinese interest to the is
land, increases public spending there, while Greenland continues its quest
for financial selfreliance.
2. The United States, although does not ‘purchase’ Greenland, still le
verages its military presence and financial aid programs to have the island
formally and informally associated with the U.S. closer than with Den
mark. The U.S. increases investments in military installations and potenti
ally in REE production. It may also join the UNCLOS to support Green
landic claims for the North Pole and the surrounding shelf. Contacts with
China and Russia are limited to a minimum.
3. Greenland obtains a fullfledged statehood, pursues nonalignment
and strives to get foreign investments on competitive terms in order to bo
ost the economic development and the people’s wellbeing.
Under scenarios 1 and 2, Greenland turns into ‘a second Alaska’ for
the U.S. protecting the Lower 48 from the northeast, with a resulting furt
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1 It is noteworthy that the package amounts 12.1million USD, or some 210 USD per capita
of Greenlanders, nearly twice as much as the U.S. had spent in Ukraine prior to 2014 (5bn USD
per 45 million of population, about 110 USD per capita) [US Admits...].
her militarization of the island and of the whole Central Arctic. Under sce
narios 1 and especially 3, China will have opportunities for developing its
bilateral political and business relations with Greenland, despite U.S. co
unteractions.
The next few years may be very important. Given the strategic impor
tance of the Arctic for China and the limited number of Arctic territories
where it may get a foothold, the competition for Greenland is likely to inc
rease.
The ongoing COVID19 pandemic is an important game changer. It
impacts China’s reputation as both the country where the virus originated,
but also the one which was the first to cope with it, while the U.S. popula
tion and economy are hit hard. This may affect the global economic deve
lopment, as well as domestic and foreign policies of all the nations concer
ned. And, though Russia has no immediate interests in Greenland, it sho
uld watch the development closely, as it is sure to impact the situation in
and around Arctic in any case.
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